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STUDENT NoTms
apparent that a new method of testing the sanity of persons accused
of crime is needed. What that method or test should be is a question
this writer does not propose to answer. As has been said, "They (the
psychiatrists and psychologists) inform us that an exact definition,
exact enough for law, that is, for use in trial is impossible. The present
definition is unscientific but science is not yet ready to frame a new
one." JAMES D. ALLEN
WILLS-ATTESTATION IN THE PRESENCE OF THE TESTATOR
I
OnJrr AND RESULT OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
"Attestation and subscription in the presence of the testator is a
common requirement of both the Statute of Frauds' and of the Statute
of Wills 2 and, accordingly, of most American statutes." 3 Superficially,
it has been said that "the design of the legislature in making this
requisition evidently was that the testator might have ocular evidence
of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witnesses."4 Such
a narrow view of the purpose of the statute has been reflected in the
cases, as will be presently shown. Professor Page has suggeste that
it is unlikely that the statute, in its common form, prevents forgery,
perjury, or fraud. Perhaps the primary object of the statute is to
make it sure that the genuine will executed by the testator is the
same one that is attested and subscribed, and that some other writing
is not substituted in place of it.6 A strict interpretation of the
statute has, in many instances, resulted in the failure of wills which
undoubtedly expressed the testator's desires.7 The statement of the
Report of the Committee of the American Bar Association on
Psychiatric Jurisprudence for the year 1928-1829, 5.
129 Car. 11, c. 3, sec. V (1677).
2 Wm. IV & I Vict. c. 26 (1837).
Percy Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills, (1923) 14 Ia. L. Rev.
1, 15.
'1 Jarman on Wills 107 (7th. ed., 1930).
1 Page on Wills, Sec. 334 (2nd ed., 1926).
"Calkins v. Calkins, 216 Ill. 458, 75 N. E. 182 (1905), noted (1905) 4
Mich. L. Rev. 246; Dubach v. Jolly, 279 Ill. 530, 117 N. E. 77 (1917).
'Gordon v. Gilmer, 141 Ga. 347, 80 S. E. 1007 (1914) (will invalid
because testator's vision obstructed by curtain or footboard of his bed) ;
Drury v. Connell, 177 Ill. 43, 52 N. E. 368 (1898) (testator must be able
to see witnesses sign, though they are in same room); Snyder v. Steele,
2S7 IIl. 159, 122 N. E. 520 (1919) (it was error to instruct that it was
enough for testatrix to be able to see witnesses and enough of act to
know that they were signing); Walker v. Walker, 174 N. E. 541 (Ill.
1931) (testatrix thirty-five feet away could see witnesses through
window-will held improperly executed), noted (1931) 16 Ia. L. Rev.
560; Burney v. Allen, 125 N. C. 314, 34 S. E. 500 (1399) (testator must
be in position to see paper as well as witnesses), noted (1900) 13 Harv.
L. Rev. 530; In re Jones' Estate, 101 Wash. 128. 172 Pac. 206 (1918)
(subscription by witnesses must be within scope of testator's vision
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court in Bradford v. Vin ton8 seems to point the way toward more




In accordance with Jarman's statement of the purpose of the
Statute of Wills,' several cases have held, or it has been flatly stated
in the opinions, that the testator must see or be able to see the wit-
nesses in the act of subscribing the will."" In re Beggans' Will" is par-
ticularly noticeable in its determination to follow a narrow construc-
tion of the statute. There the will was subscribed in a room adjoining
that in which decedent lay, but the subscribing witnesses might possibly
have been seen by decedent by changing her position. Held, in the
absence of proof that decedent actually placed herself in position to
see the witnesses sign, the will fails. A variation of this type of case
is presented in Brittingham v. Brittingham,2 where it was held that
if testator could have seen the subscription by merely turning his head,
the statute is satisfied, regardless of whether or not testator availed
himself of the opportunity. Thus, a decided relaxation of the more
stringent view is seen in a recent case, In re Lane's Estate." There the
witnesses took the will into a hospital corridor some thirty feet from
from his actual position); see also Alvin E. Evans, Incidents of Testa-
mentary Execution, (1928) 16 Ky. L. J. 199, 200 n. 2.
'59 Mich. 139, 148, 26 N. W. 401, 405 (1886).
'Supra n. 4.
'° Hill v. Barge, 12 Ala. 687 (1848) (if testator, by moving his head,
could have seen witnesses subscribe, statute is satisfied); Green v.
Davis, 228 Ala. 162, 153 So. 240 (1934) (testator could see witnesses but
not will, held improper execution); Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294 (1858)
(subscription of witnesses must be within scope of testator's vision
without his changing position or removing any obstruction); Witt v.
Gardiner, 158 Ill. 176, 41 N. E. 781 (1895) (it was error to charge that
if it was within physical power of testatrix to have seen the subscrip-
tion, then it was done in her presence, though she did not actually see
it); Orndorf v. Hummer, 51 Ky. (12 B. 'Mon.) 619 (1851) (witnesses
subscribed four or five feet back of lounge on which testator lay);
Neil v. Neil, 1 Leigh 6 (Va. 1829) (testator's back turned to witnesses
in same room); In re Wilm's Estate, 182 Wis. 242, 195 N. W. 255 (1923)
(an act cannot be said to be done in presence of another when it Is out-
side his range of vision and beyond his sense of hearing); see also 30
Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2nd ed.) 598; 1 Jarman on Willis 120;
Winston, Attestation in the Presence of the Testator, (1915) 2 Va. L.
Rev. 403.
11 68 N. J. Eq. 572, 59 Atl. 874 (1905), noted (1905) 3 Mich. L.
Rev. 591.
147 Md. 153, 127 Atl. 737 (1925); accord Ellis v. Flannigan, 253
Ill. 397, 97 N. E. 696 (1912); In re Offill's Estate, 274 Pac. 623 (Cal. App.
1929) (testator need not actually view witnesses signing will, but cir-
cumstances must allow such view).
1'265 Mich. 539, 251 N. W. 590 (1933), (1935) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 465.
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testator's bed, where it was impossible for him to see them; and sub-
scribed their names, and the will was held to be properly executed, the
court placing emphasis on tstator's sense of hearing, consciousness of
the witnesses' proximity, recognition of what was occurring, and the
absence of any suggestion of fraud, undue influence, or incompetency.
This seems to be a sound result, a conclusion of sound reasoning and
policy, and is a natural outgrowth of earlier Michigan decisions."
Similiarly, in Kitchell v. Bridgman" the witnesses subscribed the will
on a table in a hospital corridor about nine feet from testator's bed,
the table being so located that it was impossible for testator to see
witnesses or will; it was, in fact, a single transaction. The court, giving
consideration to testator's hearing, knowledge and understanding of
the circumstances, and proximity, upheld the will."
A marked tendency is thus seen in some cases to regard the
subscription as taking place in testator's presence if the position of
the witnesses and that of testator, and their proximity to him, are such
that but for some physical infirmity which did not otherwise affect
him, he could see or hear what they were doing, and if he knew and
was conscious of and understood what took place. It would seem that
the decisions reached in these cases afford to testamentary execution
all the protection provided by the more narrow rule, and at the same
time escape the probability of defeating the intentions of testators by
the too technical construction of a statute designed for their benefit."
In addition, the much vexed problems (a) whether testator must have
been able to see without any material change in position,' (b) what
constitutes a material change,' and (c) the effect of physical impossi-
bility to move,20 decrease in importance as the principle here submitted
to be sound is applied.
"Aiken v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482, 504 (1870); Bradford v. Vinton,
59 Mich. 139, 26 N. W. 401, 405, 60 Am. Rep. 276 (1886); Cook v. Win-
chester, 81 Mich. 581, 46 N. W. 106, 109 (1890), 8 L. R. A. 822; In re
Moxon's Estate, 234 Mich. 170, 175, 207 N. W. 924 (1926).
-126 Kan. 145, 267 Pac. 26 (1928).
" See also Bullock v. Morehouse, 19 F. (2d) 705, 708 (C. A. D. C.,
1927), where it is said: "The object of the provision of the statute
requiring the witnesses to sign in the presence of the testator is to
prevent imposition .... It is the result as a whole that controls, and
not the mere matter of juxtaposition."
'7 Cf. Shouler, In Presence of a Testator, (1892) 26 Am. L. Rev. 857.
8 The English cases seem to allow no change in position. 10 Can.
B. Rev. 56 (1932); Norton v. Bazett, Deane 259, 164 Eng. Rep. 569
(1856).
" Brittingham v. Brittingham, 147 Md. 153, 127 Ati. 737 (1925)
(mere turning of head not material); Jones v. Tuck, 48 N. C. 202
(1855) (raising oneself in bed held material).
"I See L. R. A. 1916C, 961; Healey v. Bartlett, 73 N. H. 110, 59 AtI.
617 (1904) (if testator could have seen except for the infirmity, it is in
his presence); contra Re Wozciechowiecz, (1931) 4 D. L R.. 585.
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B-As Effected by Cases Involving Blind Testators.
The Roman law admitted of but a limited testamentary capacity in
the blind;2' but the later developments of the civil law were away from
the earlier restrictions, and in State v. Martin it was held, in a
thorough review of civilian authorities, that the will of a blind man
was valid. At common law it is uniformly held that blindness does
not destroy testamentary capacity.? In re Allred's Will1" involved a
situation where witnesses to the will of a blind man signed it in the
room and about four feet from him. Held, since testator was fully
conscious of what was going on by means of his other senses, this con-
stituted a sufficient signing in his presence. It must be said that Welch
v. Kirbye offers some contrast to the Allred case. Here the attestation
of the will in question took place in a room connected with that in
which the blind testatrix was by an archway, testatrix and witnesses
being about ten feet apart. The court upheld the will, saying that "the
rule for a blind testator is the same as that which would be applied to
him if he had sight."2' One could do no better than quote Professor
Joseph Warren's criticism of this case:-"
"The dissenting judge, however, has the better of the argument
in requiring a narrower rule for the blind. There is no hardship
in insisting that consciousness through other senses of the wit-
nesses' act should be required of a testator who cannot see. Indeed
the protection of the statute can be secured to him in no other way;
for the test within view of a person of full capacity can give him no
aid; and yet his hearing and touch are unusually developed. An
exception to a rule, sensible in the normal situation, should be
made in the case of a person thus disabled even though a closer
proximity of the witnesses is thereby required."
III
CONCLUSION
The cases which place such stress upon testators' ocular evidence
of the subscription, in a zealous and laudable attempt to guard against
fraud, imposition, and the like, probably defeat the purpose of the
statute through a construction of it not warranted in most circum-
stances. It would seem that more of the common sense and realism to
be found in the decisions involving blind testators should be allowed to
-Cf. Weir v. Fitzgerald, 2 Bradf. 42 (N. Y. 1851).
22 La. Ann. 667 (1847).
" Davis v. Rogers, 1 Houst. 44 (Del. 1855); Elliott v. Elliott, 3 Neb.
(unofficial) 832, 92 N. W. 1006 (1902); In re McCabe, 75 Misc. 35, 134
N. Y. S. 682 (1911); Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. St. 495 (1882).
24170 N. C. 153, 86 S. E. 1047 (1915); (1916) 14 Mich. L. Rev. 356;
(1916) U. Pa. L. Rev. 535; (1916) 3 Va. L. Rev. 406.
-255 Fed. '451 (C. C. A. 8th., 1918), Wade, J., dissenting (cert.
denied 249 U. S. 612); (1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 712.
2255 Fed. 451, 455 (C. C. A. 8th., 1918).
2"The Progress of the Law-Wills and Administration", (1920) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 556, 566.
STUDENT NoTEs
flow into other factual situations, for it is believed that it was here
that the courts hit upon the true interpretation of he statute.
STEVE WHrr
LIFE INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY IN A POLICY IN
WHICH RIGHT TO MAKE SUCH A CHANGE HAS BEEN
RESERVED TO THE INSURED-KENTUCKY
RULE
The standard provision in modern insurance policies is that the
insured may, by written notice to the insurer at its home office, change
the beneficiary under the policy, such change to become effective when
it is endorsed on the policy by the insurer. Some divergence of opinion
exists as to the necessity for strict compliance with this provision. In
a few jurisdictions the procedure set out in the policy must be strictly
followed in order to make an effective change. The usual basis for
such a holding is that a condition respecting endorsement requires
more than a ministerial act on the part of the insurer, and the rights
of the original beneficiary cannot be cut off without a compliance with
such provision." However, by the great weight of authority, a change
of beneficiary can be accomplished without a strict or complete com-
pliance with the conditions of the policy regarding the endorsement of
the insurer. These jurisdictions reason that the endorsement of the
change of beneficiary by the insurer is a purely ministerial act which
the insurer cannot refuse to perform, and that therefore a failure of
the insurer to perform such act will not defeat the change of beneficiary
if the insured has done everything reasonably within his power to
effect a change.2
The cases place Kentucky unequivocably with the majority of
jurisdictions upon this question.3 Manning v. Ancient Order of United
'Sheppard v. Crowley, 61 Fla. 735, 55 So. 341 (1911); Freund v.
Freund, 213 Ill. 189, 75 N. E. 925 (1905); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Deyer-
burg, 101 N. J. Eq. 90, 137 Atl. 785 (1927); Douglas v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 11 Ohio N. P. N. S. 531, 21 Ohio Dec. N. P. 516 (1911); Kress
v. Kress, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 404 (1921).
"Reid v. Durboraw, 272 Fed. 99 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921); Johnston v.
Kearns, 107 Cal. App. 557, 290 Pac. 640 (1930); Reliance L. Ins. Co. v.
Bennington, 142 Md. 390, 121 Atl. 369 (1923); Kochanck v. Prudential
Ins. Co, 262 Mass. 174, 159 N. E. 520 (1928); Quist v. Western and
Southern L. Ins. Co., 219 Mich. 406, 189 N. W. 49 (1922); Re Lynch,
135 Misc. 406, 237 N. Y. Supp. 663 (1929); Teague v. Pilot L. Ins. Co.,
200 N. C. 450, 157 S. E. 421 (1931).
3 Manning v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 86 Ky. 136, 5
S. W. 385 (1887); Lockett v. Lockett, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 300, 80 S. W.
1152 (1904); Howe v. Fidelity Trust Co. Trustee, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 485,
89 S. W. 521 (1905); Vaughan's Admr. v. Daugherty, 152 Ky. 732, 154
S. W. 9 (1913); Landrum v. Landrum's Admx., 186 Ky. 775, 218 S. W.
274 (1920); Twyman v. Twyman, 201 Ky. 102, 255 S. W. 1031 (1923);
Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 20 S. W. (2d) 1029 (1929); Farley et al.
v. First National Bank, 250 Ky. 150, 61 S. W. (2d) 1059 (1933); Inter-
